Bird Flu - And Only Bird Flu
H5N1 cannot become a human pandemic. At least, not without some help.
Earlier this month, there was a momentary H5N1 scare. Two people in Cambodia, and 25 military cadets in Chile, were infected and killed by the virus, and the WHO showed up in force to investigate and contain the outbreak. I even had the good fortune to finally connect with Chris Sky due to our momentarily shared interest in what appeared to potentially be the beginnings of Bill Gates’ promised second pandemic, that would really make us pay attention this time.
Given the WHO’s recent efforts to implement their pandemic treaty, effectively handing over nation-states’ sovereignty to the WHO upon the arbitrarily determined declaration of any new pandemic, the timing and potential severity of this new pandemic, and the possibility that the virus had been modified to adapt to human hosts - especially given that gain of function work on H5N1 was the primary reason GoF was temporarily banned in the US in 2014, which began the chain of events leading to SARS-CoV-2 at the Wuhan Institute of Virology - I was very suspicious of an incipient, renewed media fear campaign. In case you missed the leaks of Matt Hancock’s WhatsApp messages, scaring the bejeezus out of everybody is their standard M.O. at this point. Being determined to oppose these genocidal criminals and their agenda, and skeptical of the possibility that H5N1 had any serious pandemic potential, I wasn’t going to give it the time of day. However, a few people were starting to get nervous, so I took a look.
My initial reaction, having taken a look at the mutations discovered and noted by the authors of a surprisingly rapidly produced full RNA sequence, was that of surprise and concern; whilst they had noted that the mutations (Q31K, A102V, N110S, V273I, and K388R) were unlikely to improve the virus’ capacity to infect and transmit between humans, a back-of-the-envelope examination of the molecules’ binding properties indicated otherwise. That was enough to give it a much closer look.
While it was not a difficult call to raise alarms about SARS-CoV-2 early on - especially since I had something approximating a cheat sheet as to the virus’ gain of function and capacity to cause acute and chronic disease - I have had no such head-start for H5N1. As such, starting from the beginning, and trying to find something that does not, in the end, appear to exist, this article has taken a lot longer than I had planned.
My apologies to those of you who recently subscribed, and may have been expecting a great deal more writing than I have produced over the past month; with this done and behind me, I expect I’ll be getting back to much more regular publication. So much has been happening on the geopolitical stage these last few weeks, and there’s still quite a bit of my ongoing research at various stages of completion to share. Many thanks to those of you who have stayed with us this month - it means a great deal to my family and I, and we are very grateful for your support. For those of you who haven’t subscribed - what are you waiting for? 👀
Before I get into all the details, I’ll give you the cliff notes version: there’s just no there there. There is absolutely nothing that I’ve found, or that any of my colleagues have found, indicating that any major gain-of-function work has been done on the recent variants of concern, and even if there was, the creation of an evolutionarily sound, human-transmissible form of this virus would, without SARS-CoV-2-like gain-of-function entirely superlative to its ordinary modes of morbidity and mortality, render the virus barely any more harmful than any other seasonal flu virus.
This is also a good time to point out that, from the perspectives of our genocidal overlords and their lackeys, a bioweapon does not necessarily need to be actually dangerous. So long as they can use it to terrorize people, it’ll suffice. Don’t fall for it.
At any rate, there is no indication, that I can identify, of any such relevant work on this virus having been conducted* or released into the wild, and in my opinion, nobody needs a vaccine for this any more than they need a regular flu vaccine - and nobody needs that, either. Unfortunately, that means that this article is going to be pretty much just an exploration of the various features of H5N1, as well as a note on how to treat it, in the unlikely event of an infection. It should be interesting for those of you so inclined, but there aren’t any earth-shattering revelations to be found here.
*Extensive gain of function research has been conducted on various strains of H5N1, but there is no indication that any of it is applicable to the viruses detected in Cambodia or Chile, or anywhere else in the world.
Bottom line: it’s incredibly dangerous for avian species, and any mammals or humans that they may coincidentally infect, but the chances of it becoming a human pandemic are just this side of nil, so…
We’ll be fine.
In the event a person does become infected - which is not particularly unlikely, given the extensive prevalence in birds and some wild animals presently - H5N1 is a single-stranded RNA virus, circulating without any apparent unnatural additions, with fairly vanilla immune evasive features. As such, standard treatment protocols for COVID-19 (that is, those in use by competent practitioners, including ivermectin, HCQ+Zinc, steroids incl. prednisolone, high doses of vitamin C; and in treatment-resistant cases, Atezolizumab, or similar PD-1/PD-L1 inhibitors, may be useful) are highly likely to be just as effective as they are for COVID, and to dramatically reduce the otherwise stratospheric mortality rate. Due to the rapid progression that is typically observed, significantly above and beyond that of ordinary seasonal influenza, kitchen-sink treatment as early and aggressively as possible is highly advisable.
How It Infects Us
The virus's hemagglutinin protein, specifically its shape, is the primary determinant of of any given variant’s capacity to infect the various sialic acid-linked receptors, the forms of which vary in location and conformation between various taxonomic classes. Consider it an analogue of the SARS-CoV-2 spike protein, at least insofar as its function. Unlike SARS-CoV-2, which features a number of gain-of-function additions to the spike, causing a great many pathologies above and beyond simply facilitating the infection of a cell, I have not uncovered any similar such modifications to the HA protein of any circulating variant of H5N1.
The HA protein of H5N1 preferentially binds to α-2,3-linked sialic acids, which are much more prevalent in various avian species, and present in humans in the lower respiratory tract and gut, among others. Their presence in the lower respiratory tract is primarily what makes it so dangerous for humans; just as pre-Omicron SARS-CoV-2 preferentially infected the lower respiratory tract to cause pneumonia, so too does H5N1; their expression in the gut also facilitates the uncommon situation wherein consuming under-cooked, infected bird meat also presents a potential route for viral infection.